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Protection against Judicial Review
H.W. ARTHURS
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University

I have been asked to speak on the subject: "limitations on judicial
review". As framed, the topic seems to contemplate that unlimited
judicial review is possible, natural, desirable, or inevitable and that our
concerns ought to focus on illicit attempts to impede it. I do not believe
judicial review is any of those things, and I have nailed my colours to
the mast by changing the title of my paper in order to signal my
disagreement.
Let me go further, I suggest that the assumption buried in the
original formulation of the topic for this session pervades this whole
conference. As originally announced, this conference was to address
the theme "Judicial Review: A Second Chance at Justice". A question
mark was added to this assertion only because the chairman was kind
enough to indulge my own contrary views. Moreover, the organizing
categories for the conference sessions are the substantive and procedural issues connected with judicial review. And the individuals who
are to speak to those issues are lawyers and judges and academics,
most of whom are deeply implicated in the judicial review industry,
whether as producers, consumers or spectators.
What we do not have is any analysis of the vast array of administrative institutions and agencies being reviewed - indeed, unless I am
wrong, not a single administrator has been invited to address us. We
have no session given over to a balanced inquiry into the costs and benindeed, no means of even entering upon such
efits of judicial review
an inquiry. We have no reason, in short, to ask of ourselves the fundamental questions which honest and reflective people ought to want to
ask. Instead, we regard as given precisely what is most problematic in
the relation of the administrative and judicial arms of government. And
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in doing so, we find ourselves squarely within our own intellectual and
professional tradition which, as it happens, appropriates the very
notion of "The Rule of Law" for a particular world-view which places
courts and lawyers at the centre of the universe. 1
This is not a world-view shared by everyone. If this were a conference of administrators, for example, its agenda would be concerned
about ways in which the public policies adopted by parliament could
be made operative by education, rule-making, administration, inspection, negotiation and adjudication; judicial review would not likely
receive much attention, except perhaps as an exogenous and
dysfunctional element. If this were a conference of legal philosophers
whether
or anthropologists, formal adjudication in the higher courts
would be seen as a minor star in
at first instance or by way of review
the great galaxy of law sources which generate and enforce norms of
behaviour in both the public and private sector. And even if this were a
conference designed to tell lawyers how to vindicate their clients'
interests, or even to tell them how to vindicate the rule of law in its
most parochial sense, its focus would surely be on securing justice in
the first instance, rather than on trying to obtain it after the fact, in a
review proceeding.
But judicial review is the business of this conference, and my task
is to discuss ways in which - for good or ill it may be foreclosed or
inhibited.
Frqm a legal-analytical point of view, the problem is essentially
simple. In reviewing administrative rulings, courts are supposed to
· ensure that they conform to law, and are made in a lawful manner.
Their jurisdiction to review administrative rulings is said to be "inherent" but it is in principle subject to any contrary or limiting directions
from parliament. If parliament does not want judicial review, it ·need
only say so clearly. So here is a simple problem: how can it say so
clearly?
For almost 200 years, the parliaments of Canada and the United
Kingdom, and no doubt other countries, have been crying to find language which courts will accept at face value and which will restrain the
irresistible impulse towards judicial review. I will not burden you with

1. For a discussion of the Dicey
"Rule of Law" influence on administrative law,
see Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business", (1979)
17 Osg. Hall L.J. 1.
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historical chapter and verse. 2 I will simply say that in the nineteenth
century privative clauses were enacted to protect the decisions of many
minor courts and. administrative tribunals with the same variable
results we know today, and for all the same reasons.
Why have privative clauses not forestalled judicial review? Legislative draughtsmen in Canada have certainly tried to do so. During the
1950's and 1960's, they produced, as the next-to-last word on the subject, language which typically provided:
(l)that administrative decisions were final and binding;
(2)that they should not be questioned or reviewed in any court;
and
(3)that none of the procedural devices used by reviewing courts
- prerogative writs, declarations or injunctions - should be
invoked against administrative decisions.
Through a familiar, if dubious, process of reasoning this language
came to be interpreted as protecting administrative decisions so long as
they were made in accordance with procedural standards of fairness or
natural justice, and within the jurisdiction of tribunal. But as others
will have explained in greater detail, the concept of "jurisdiction" soon
became the battleground.
On occasion, the Supreme Court of Canada has viewed any error
of law as jurisdictional;3 or has suggested that jurisdiction might be
declined or lost by "asking the wrong question";4 or has attempted to
give precise shape to "jurisdiction" by framing it within a structure of
rickety synonyms such as "preliminary" or "collateral"; 5 or most
recently has begun to use "jurisdiction" as a test for administrative
rabies: if the administrative decision is not "patently unreasonable", it
is made within jurisdiction and will be spared; if it exhibits signs of
intellectual derangement, it will be suppressed. 6 These decisions seem
to signal the Supreme Court's acquiescence in the modern trend
2. A general account is found in Arthurs, "Jonah and the Whale: The Appearance,
Disappearance and Reappearance of Administrative Law", (1980) 30 U.T.L.J.
225. Further details will be found in a forthcoming work.
3. Jarvis v. Associated Medical Services, (1964) 44 D.L.R. (2d) 407 (S.C.C.).
4. Metropolitan Life v. International Union of Operating Engineers, (1970) 11
D.L.R. (3d) 336 (S.C.C.).
5. Re Galloway Lumber and B.C. Labour Relations Board, (1965) 48 D.L.R. (2d)
587 (S.C.C.).
6. C.U.P.E. Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., (1979) 97 D.L.R. (3d) 417
(S.C.C.).
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towards serial monogamy in marital relationships. It has transferred its
favours from one test of jurisdiction to another without either speaking
ill of the test it has left behind or promising life-long fidelity to its new
love. Since these have all been common law unions, however, we cannot accuse the Supreme Court of polygamy, strictissimi juris. 7
How can one explain these decisions, and the many others in
which the Supreme Court and other courts have dallied with different
tests for jurisdiction? Given the initial fact that the privative clauses in
question purported to exclude all judicial review, and not just jurisdictional review, this question may not seem ,to be the one which claims
most urgent consideration. But if we accept that the courts will review
jurisdictional error until explicitly told to do otherwise, is there no unifying theme or logic in the Supreme Court's decisions? One can only
assure that the residual survival of jurisdictional review, and the
expansion and contraction of the meaning of "jurisdiction", reflect on
the one hand the court's ongoing determination to retain some control
over administrative decisions, and on the other its ephemeral views as
to whether and how that control should be exercised in particular
cases.
This is not a subtle conclusion, yet rather surprisingly, a distinctly
unsubtle government - the former NDP government of British
Columbia
seems to have read the jurisprudence differently. That
government came to the astonishing conclusion that reviewing courts
actually meant what they said, and that they continued to concern
themselve~ with "jurisdiction" only because no one had ever told them
to stop doing so. As judicial review was no longer wanted - for reasons extensively canvassed in the legislative debates and briefly hereafter - the new Labour Code of British Columbia in 1973 proclaimed
that in the future jurisdictional issues would be decided exclusively by
the labour board for itself. This is the ultimate privative clause. What
subtle analysis. What logical draughtsmanship. What charming
naivete.

7. But what are we to make of Teamsters Union Local 938 v. Massicotte, (1982) 134
D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.), in which the Court unanimously embraces the New
Brunswick Liquor Corp. test, supra note 6, and then concludes (at p. 395): "In so
far as theAnisminic and Metropolitan Life Ins. cases deal with the so-called 'wrong
question' test of jurisdiction, they have no relevance here"? Is the Supreme Court:
(l) reaffirming Metropolitan Life Ins.? (2) distinguishing it
but if so upon what
grounds? or (3) signalling that Metropolitan Life Ins. will never again "have any
relevance"?
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So far, this novel privative clause, section 33 of the Labour
Code, 8 has not so much prevented judicial scrutiny as it has coopted it.
The labour board has been very circumspect in relying upon the clause
and the courts have simply ignored it on occasion, rather than confront
it head on. 9 As a result, the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to make
an authoritative interpretation of section 33.
Nor, alas, is it ever likely to do so. What was
subtly, logically,
naively - thought by the British Columbia government to be a simple
problem of statutory drafting and interpretation turns out to have been
much more. Section 33 was to privative clauses what the Maginot line
was to military tactics: a virtually impregnable legislative project of
defence, designed to protect the board's jurisdiction from frontal
assault. And now it has suffered the same fate. It has been outflanked
by a judicial panzer attack, a virtual constitutional blitzkrieg.
I refer, of course, to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Crevier v. A.G. Quebec. 10 That case struck down a provision in the
Quebec Professional Code which had conferred upon the Professions
Tribunal plenary power to hear and decide appeals from various professional disciplinary bodies, and which prevented any judicial review
of the decisions of the Professions Tribunal. Insofar as the decision
rests upon the conclusion that the province may not establish an administrative tribunal with "detached" appellate functions, it is somewhat

8. Now R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212, s. 33: "The board has and shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the extent of its jurisdiction under this Act, a collective
agreement or the regulations, to determine a fact or question of law necessary to
establish its jurisdiction and to determine whether or in what manner it shall exercise its jurisdiction."
9. For an analysis of the jurisprudence see Gall, "Judicial Review of Labour Tribunals: A Functional Analysis", in Proceedings of the Administrative Law Conference, Faculty of Law U.B.C., 1979 (publ'd. by U.B.C. L.R., 1981), at 305 ff.,
and for some evidence of the attitude of the board and the court see Weiler, "Judges
and Administrators: An Issue in Constitutional Policy," lac. cit., at 379, esp. at
390. Recent cases seem to indicate a somewhat diminished willingness on the part
of the courts to defer to the board: see Better Value Furniture and Vancouver Distribution Centre v. General Truck Drivers Union Loe. 31 & Walcott, (1981) 26
B.C.L.R. 273 (B.C.C.A.) (court asserts primary jurisdiction over picketing, concurrent with board); Re Metal Industries Assoc. and Davis Wire Industries, (1980)
113 D.L.R. (3d) 724 (B.CS.C.) ("vague and uncertain" board order set aside on
judicial review; s. 33 not referred to in judgment).
10. (1982) 127 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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metaphysical but not directly pertinent. 11 However, insofar as it
addresses privative clauses, Crevier is pertinent indeed:
In my opinion [said Chief Justice Laskin for a unanimous Court) where a
provincial Legislature purports to insulate one of its statutory tribunals
from any curial review of its adjudicative functions, the insulation
encompassing jurisdiction, such provincial legislation must be struck
down as unconstitutional by reason of having the effect of constituting
the tribunal a s. 96 Court. 12

This is not the place to analyze Crevier from a legal perspective: I
regard it as an illogical, a-historical, unnecessary and unwise extension
of the authorities on section 96 13 • Nonetheless, I accept that I am
unlikely to persuade this audience that nine judges of the Supreme
Court were profoundly wrong in law. Perhaps, my effort would be better spent in trying to demonstrate what Crevier ultimately implies for
the administrative process, and for judicial re7iew.
Essentially, Crevier is but one more manifestation of the lawyers'
world-view of which I spoke earlier. It makes overt and elevates to
constitutional status what formerly was only inferential and halfvisible as an approach to statutory interpretatlon: the subordination of
the carefully-considered wishes of a democratically-elected legislature
to the hegemony asserted by judges and lawyers over the law, its interpretation and its administration. This issue has surfaced in many other
contexts recently: in the constitutional entrenchment of civil
liberties;, 14 in the increasing tendency of the judiciary to claim autonomy in fiscal, administrative and disciplinary matters relating to judges

11. This conclusion ought properly to evoke extended meditation. For example, the
"Appellate Tribunal" of the Ontario Workmen's Compensation Board
apparently "detached" from other parts of the scheme to ensure independent adjudication - each year decides several thousand appeals from a hierarchy of claims officers and adjudicators. The courts no doubt cqntemplate the possible descent upon
them of this additional appellate workload with equanimity.
12. 127 D.L.R. (3d) 12.
13. In brief: "illogical" since it applies only to provincial and not to federal tribunals;
"a-historical" since it ignores both pre-Confederation restraints on judicial review
and subsequent changes in governmental structures; "unnecessary" since the case
could have been disposed of on the first ground mentioned; and "unwise" because
judicial review has operated so erratically and because "jurisdiction" has been
such an unreliable touchstone. But not "surprising": this outcome was anticipated
by me in ""The Dullest Bill": Reflections on the Labour Code of British Columbia", (1974) 9 U.B.C. L.R. 280, and by Weiler, op. cit., supra, note 9, at 389-90.
The Supreme Court notes a variety of academic views at 127 D.L.R. (3d) 14.
14. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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and their work, 15 in the similar autonomy claimed by lawyers and
in
endorsed in Jabour by the Supreme Court, 16 and - in Crevier
the design and operation of public administration as it may intrude
upon functions which the courts choose to regard as their own.
Judicial review of administrative decisions cannot be understood
in isolation from the way in which the powers and functions of courts
are generally perceived in our society. What I must say immediately is
that judges and lawyers have not simply claimed for the courts a leading role in the great drama of public affairs. Governments have cast
them in this role in both the basic conception of our new Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and in the political wars that preceded its adoption.17 They have done so, as well, in enacting so-called "reform" legislation which has facilitated and expanded judicial review. 18 Professors and political commentators too have often urged greater reliance
upon juridical, rather than political and bureaucratic, processes which,
today, are perceived to lack credibility. And individual litigants and
groups of litigants, exasperated and frustrated by ineffective and
unresponsive governments, have turned for solace to the courts even
when, as in the Residential Tenancies case, 19 they may well ultimately conclude that it would have been better to have loved and lost
than never to have loved at all.
So I do not say that judicial review is entirely a matter of selfaggrandizement, although I accept that since Crevier its limitation will
depend upon self-restraint. But why should there be such limitations?
15. See e.g. Maftres chez eux!Masters in their own House (the Deschenes Report)
(Montreal: C.l.A.J., 1981).
·
16. Jabour v. Law Society of British Columbia (unreported, S.C.C. 1982), per Estey
J.: "The independence of the Bar from the state in all its pervasive manifestations
is one of the hallmarks of a free society. Consequently regulation of these members of the Jaw profession by the state must, so far as by human ingenuity it can be
so designed, be free from state interference, in the political sense, with the delivery of services to the individual citizens in the state ... The public interest in a free
society knows no area more sensitive than the independence, impartiality and
availability to the general public of the members of the Bar ... "
17. Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, (1981) 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1
(S.C.C.); it must also be said that the Court could have declined to play this role,
see Hogg, "Comment", (1982) 60 C.B.R. 307, 320 ff.
18. See e.g. Statutory Powers Procedures Act, S.O. 1971, c. 47; Judicial Review
Procedure Act., S.O. 1971, c. 43; Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, S.0.
1971, c. 50.
19. In Reference re Residential Tenancies Act, (1981) 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554 (S.C.C.),
tenants' groups joined with landlords in seeking (successfully) to have declared
invalid under s. 96 the assignment of certain adjudicative functions to an administrative tribunal.
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This brings me at last to my reasons for favouring limitations and
restraints upon judicial review, if not its virtual abandonment. 20
First to put the matter bluntly, the present vocabulary and conceptual structure of judicial review is largely incoherent. Despite the monumental efforts of people like Rene Dussault, John Evans and David
Mullan to rationalize the caselaw and to squeeze out of it clearly stated
and logically consistent doctrines, chaos persists. 21 Attempts to
replace the present contradictory and complex rules with a few simple
notions such as "fairness" and "reasonableness", do no more than
mask the chaos, by allowing a reviewing judge to state his conclusion
without disclosing his reasoning processes. 22 And what may seem
obviously "fair" or "reasonable" to one judge or tribunal member may
be just the opposite to another.
Second, the present incoherence is not in fact capable of being
resolved by diligent scholarship. At its root is the inevitable tendency
of good judges to want to do the right thing, to shield citizens against
perceived injustices, to vindicate legal values. These tendencies are so
strong that they lead judges to reach results by whatever means come
to hand: strict or purposive-interpretations-of the governing legislation,
technical or liberal attitudes towards the tribunal's procedural and evidentiary requirements, conservative or creative use of the courts'
remedial powers, and most importantly, selection of a restrained or
interventionist attitude towards the judges' own role. What happens on
the surface of the judgment is, in the end, determined not so much by
text-book maxims as by the judges, conviction that the interest of justice will or will not be served by a particular result.
But this conviction gives rise to a serious problem: a court's view
of "justice" will not necessarily conform to that of the legislature or of

20. I do not argue that review should be foreclosed on issues of constitutionality,
although I do not concede that "issues of jurisdiction ... are not far removed from
issues of constitutionality", per Laskin C.J.C. in Crevier, 127 D.L.R. (3d) 14.
21. Of course enhanced clarity and simplification of legal doctrine and procedure is
not necessarily a good in itself. Whether any particular change in the law is a
"reform" is very much a function of both (a) whether the change facilitates judicial
review, and (b) whether one wishes to facilitate judicial review.
22. For criticism of the open-ended nature of the "fairness" doctrine, see Loughlin,
"Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administrative Law Theory",
(1978) 28 U.T.L.J. 215. For a serious, albeit inchoate, effort to respond, see
Dickson J. in Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board (No. 2 ), (1979)
106 D.L.R. (3d) 385, 392 ff. (S.C.C.).
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the administrative tribunal it is reviewing. There are several reasons
for this possible discrepancy.
Essentially, courts and the tribunals they review do not inhabit the
same universe of discourse. The legislature may well have assigned
particular tasks to the administration precisely in order to replace value
judgments enshrined in the common or civil law with a new set of
value judgments. The judges' views of "justice", however, naturally
tend to remain consistent with the assumptions of the system in which
they continue to work, rather than with those of the new regime from
which they have been excluded. Nor should we forget that these value
judgments involve highly controversial political, social and economic
issues. While all good judges doubtless try to avoid narrow partisanship, few of them will be willing to accept that values are in fact even
implicit in the "noncontroversial" rules of law which have become part
of their way of understanding the world, and especially of performing
their jobs. But the old saw that "one man's due process is another's red
tape" neatly reminds us of the difficulty. 23
Nor is the difficulty resolved by making the legislature define
"justice" more clearly and encouraging judges to defer to the statutory
definition. Even judges who are willing to respond to these new definitions of justice will not necessarily have any basis for deciding how
they affect the particular case involved in review proceedings. After
all, they see the administrative regime in terms of its pathology - a
single case where the system is said to have misfired
while those
responsible for the regime see it in terms of its normal, satisfactory
functioning. The different perspectiyes are likely to produce different
perceptions. The administrator's reference point is specific: what will
best accomplish the purposes of the statute. The judge's reference
point is general: what will best ensure that the administrative outcome
conforms to notions of substantive and procedural justice as they exist
elsewhere in the world of law.
These problems of differing perceptions, intrinsic in any situation
where two groups of people from different worlds meet only occasionally and at moments of tension, are exacerbated by yet another set of
problems - the problems of decision-making in a black box. Judges
have cut themselves off from various means of learning more about the
policy judgments and practical constraints which produce administrative decisions. Most judges are too busy to read at large in areas of sub23. See e.g. Canadian Institute of Public Real Estate Companies v. City of Toronto,
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 2.
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stantive administrative law such as planning, labour relations, welfare
or telecommunications, let alone in other disciplines whose insights
often determine administrative behaviour, such as economics or organization theory. Rules which prevent the use of extrinsic evidence or
recourse to parliamentary debates often ensure that legislative intention
will remain, or even become, problematic. 24 Lest advocacy by the tribunal itself enlighten the court as to why a particular interpretation or
procedure or policy was adopted, the tribunal's right to participate in
review proceedings has been tightly circumscribed by decisions such
as Transair, 25 which draw a false analogy between administrative tribunals and inferior courts and obscure the difference between review
and appeal.
In the result a court must address the rightness or wrongness of
the administrative decision in virtual darkness, or at least without the
aid of illumination provided by the historical or social facts, or the tribunal's experience or explanations. One recalls that in F arrah 26 and
again in Crevier, the right to perform "detached" appellate functions
was reserved to the superior courts. Just how "detached" such functions can be becomes more obvious when we consider the rules by
which the courts themselves conduct the rite of review: the atmosphere
evoked seems almost more druidical than juridical.
One might shrug off the intellectual and institutional shortcomings of judicial review if one were convinced that it was no worse than
a lottery in which all those involved.in the administrative process held
an equal thance of drawing a winning ticket. But although we know
that litigants with greater resources enjoy certain advantages in most
situations, the disparities are felt with particular severity in judicial
review proceedings. I will not dwell upon the usual difficulties: the
greater ability of wealthy litigants to muster the moral fortitude to challenge decisions, the money to afford good counsel and more appeals,
24. The Supreme Court, in liberalizing the rules for introduction of.extrinsic evidence
as an aid to constitutional interpretation in the Residential Tenancies reference,
was at some pains to stress that "extrinsic materials are not available for the purpose of aiding in statutory construction", supra, note 19, at p. 563. "A constitutional reference is not a barren exercise in statutory interpretation", said Dickson
J. at p. 562. He does not explain why statutory interpretation should itself be a
"barren exercise".
25. Re Canada L.R.B. and Transair Ltd., (1976) 67 D.L.R. (3d) 421 (S.C.C.), and
see also Central Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada L.R.B., (1976) 67 D.L.R. (3d)
538 (S.C.C.) and Re Northwestern. Utilities and City of Edmonton, (1978) 89
D.L.R. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.).
26. A.G. Quebec v. Farrah, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 638.
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and the political sagacity to use litigation for tactical delay while
seeking other solutions. Judicial review proceedings disfavour the poor
and the powerless in several unique ways as well.
When such individuals themselves complain about administrative
behaviour
as aggrieved welfare claimants, jail inmates, immigrants
or consumers - they can seldom demonstrate legal entitlement.
Often, their interests tend to be characterized as "privileges", as
dependent upon the policy, discretion or judgment of the administration, or as non-justiciable claims appropriate only for executive action
or political solution. 27 In recent years, when they have occasionally
succeeded in judicial review proceedings, their victories have been
pyrrhic: procedural flaws have resulted in new determinations, properly made but to the same effect; favourable substantive interpretations
of the law by reviewing courts have been treated as disposing of individual cases, and ignored as a basis of future administrative decisions.28
Some might feel that the answer to this particular complaint
should be more judicial review, not less, that courts can and should
indeed force government to be more responsive, especially to those
who have no realistic access to political power. I will in a moment
attempt to explain why courts cannot ultimately function as superlegislatures or super-administrations. However, let me content myself
with saying that the courts do not now claim to enjoy a mandate, or
indeed the practical means, to function as the moral tutor of other
branches of government. Ironically, the greatest impact of judicial
review on administrative behaviour seems to occur in cases where government, for its own reasons, wishes to adopt a narrow view of its own
27. See e.g. Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board (No. 2), (1980) 106
D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.). On the other hand, standing to raise constitutional
questions has in recent years been greatly enlarged, see e.g. Min. of Justice v.
Borowski, (1981) 130 D.L.R. (3d) 588 (S.C.C.).
28. This phenomenon is not confined to administrative law, see e.g. Danzig, The
Capability Problem in Contract Law (Mineola: Foundation Press, 1978). But we
should surely ask, for example, what did happen to Mr. Nicholson after his
famous victory ([1979] I S.C.R. 311) before glibly assuming: (a) he got a permanent appointment (as last advised, he did not), (b) his employer, the Haldimand
Norfolk Police Commission, recast its procedures for dealing with probationary
employees, (c) that other employers or persons making similar statutory decisions
have now begun to accord "fairness" to persons affected by them, and (d) that they
can or should do so. For some very salutory second thoughts on Nicholson by a
scholar whose writing helped to bring it about see Mullan, "Procedural Fairness
Nicholson and the Tasks Ahead", op. cit., supra, note 9, at 219.
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powers. This it may do by forcing all decisions into an adjudicatiye
mould, to meet court-imposed procedural requiremynts, or by making
all decisions "within the four comers of the statute", ~o avoid review of
discretionary or interpretative decisions. In either ca~e, judicial review
- actual, anticipated, or just conveniently conjured tip - provides an
excuse for minimum action.
On the other hand, much regulatory legislation represents a
genuine attempt to redress the balance of power between organized or
corporate interests, and often unorganized ordinary citizens. If a
regulatory agency is doing its job aggressively, it may well make decisions which fall with measurable impact upon, say, a particular business, whose procedural and substantive complaints may then be
carried forward for review. In the review proceeding, however, that
business is the moving party, but who will be able to defend the public
interest? Not individual citizens, since they will seldom have a sufficient stake in either the original proceedings or the review proceedings. Not aggregations or organizations of citizens, in many cases,
because these do not always ~xist, and when they do, they almost
never have enough money. Not the agency itself - or at least not the
agency participating as a full-throated spokesman for the public interest - since the scope of its advocacy has been judicially limited.
Judicial review, in practice, seems to do little to rectify disparities
of power, and occasionally much to magnify them. Must it always be
so?
(

I have already suggested that courts cannot and should not function as super-legislatures or super-administrations. Many will deny
that judicial review implies any such ambitious role for the courts, or
indeed anything more than a modest monitoring function, designed to
ensure technical compliance with "the law". This is surely a disingenuous perspective.
We know, sometimes because of the way they act, sometimes
because of what they say judicially or extrajudicially, that judges have
views on such subjects as state intervention in the economy and the relative merits of adjudication by courts and boards. 29 We know because
29. The "famous" examples are legion. I cite here only a recent and all-too-typical
remark by a Canadian judge who praised "Lord Hewart's heroic assault (in The
New Despotism, 1929) on the encroachments of bureaucracy, and the concept of
administrative justice," and added that "all of us whose lives are devoted to the
law could profit from the revelation which Lord Hewart gave us in his vision of
the dictatorship of the bureaucracy." (reference omitted). Obviously there are a
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of terminology such as ''superior" courts and "inferior" tribunals where
they imagine themselves to stand in the pecking order relative to the
labour board or the National Energy Board or municipal councils. We
know because of their insistence upon compliance with "natural justice" and "fairnesss" that they have a principled commitment to
adversarial procedures over others, and as well a pragmatic willingness
to use emotive language which robs all non-adversarial procedures of
any claim to legitimacy.
Knowing all these things, is it possible to believe that when
judges decide upon the "legality" of administrative conduct, they do so
in a purely technical sense? that when they adopt one or another meaning of unclear statutory language or resolve ambiguities by recourse to
presumptions or implied requirements of "reasonableness" they are not
in effect making legislative decisions? that when they enforce adherence to "fairness", or guarantee the use of cross-examination, they are
not in effect redesigning the machinery by which administrative decisions are made?
And if we do not believe all these things, must we not ask, in the
words of the old writ: "quo warranto"? What special skills, knowledge
or qualifications, what special invitation from the people, leads judges
to believe that they should engage in this kind of activity?
There is no reason to believe that a judge who reads a particular
regulatory statute once in his life, perhaps in worst-case circumstances, can read it with greater fidelity to legislative purpose than an
administrator who is sworn to uphold that purpose, who strives to do
so daily, and is well-aware of the effect upon the purpose of the
various alternate interpretations. There is no reason to believe that a
legally-trained judge is better qualified to determine the existence or
sufficiency or appropriateness of evidence on a given point than a
trained economist or engineer, an arbitrator selected by the parties, or
simply an experienced tribunal member who decides such cases day in
and day out. There is no reason to believe that a judge whose entire
professional life has been spent dealing with disputes one by one
should possess an aptitude for issues which arise often because an
administrative system dealing with cases in volume has been designed
to strike an appropriate balance between efficiency and effective rights
of participation. And there is no reason why one group of individuals,
spectrum of other views as well, although relatively few seem to pass beyond a
live-and-let-live attitude towards administrative tribunals to any degree of enthusiasm.
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however intelligent and Wi1ll-intentioned, should project upon the rest
of society an image of how things ought to be run, an image which can
only be the product of their own highly unrepresentative education,
experience and personal characteristics.
It is such considerations as these that have persuaded governments - from Victorian English tories to contemporary Canadian
socialists - to protect administrative decisions against judicial review.
And yet the claim persists that the courts can and should
must! review.
There is no warrant in our constitutional history for such an
extravagant claim, nor is it either expressed or implied by our new
Charter. Indeed, it must be recalled that several efforts were made to
implant in the Charter language which would have given judicial
review of administrative action explicit constitutional grounding, but
these attempts failed. 30
Still, Crevier is the law of the land, and it guarantees some irreducible minimum of judicial review, at least at the provincial level.
Given this fact, I can only hope that those who undertake the task of
judicial review will be aware that it is not one which they can discharge
without assuming broad and difficult responsibilities. Indeed it is not
one which present arrangements permit them to perform either fairly,
satisfactorily or with a full appreciation of the consequences. If this
seems like an invitation to self-doubt, it is. "There lives more faith in
honest doubts" said Tannyson "than in half the creeds". Including, I
now add, the creed of judicial review.

30. The Canadian Bar Association recommended that the right to judicial review of
administrative decisions be constitutionally enshrined, and the Progressive Conservative party's attempt to provide constitutional protection of property rights
was rebuffed (at the urging of the N.D.P.) on the ground that this would provide a
basis for further judicial intervention into government regulatory activities.
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